With tough questions being
asked on Capitol Hill and about 80 members of Congress calling for pressure on
Saudi Arabia to lift its blockade of Yemen, it cannot be long before the Biden
administration will be expected to deliver real results to end a six-year
conflict that has caused what the United Nations says is the world’s worst
humanitarian crisis.
The supply of aid and the
lifting of the blockade would save countless lives. Yet they are consequences
of the conflict, not its cause. Addressing them alone will not bring an end to
war.
Neither will they change
the fact that a ceasefire plan backed by the Biden administration and the
Saudis has been rejected by the Houthi rebels who took control of the capital
Sanaa in September 2014, with Yemen’s president going into exile when the Saudi
bombing campaign started in early 2015. Whilst some deride the group’s
intransigence, the impasse lies in expecting failed diplomatic solutions of the
past to suddenly gain purchase in the present.
The international approach
remains framed by UN Security Council Resolution 2216. Drafted by the Saudis in
2015, the resolution demanded the advancing Houthis’ unconditional surrender to
the Yemeni government that had gone into exile in Riyadh.
It was never realistic to
expect the Houthis, then in control of over half the country, to withdraw from
seized territory and lay down arms for nothing in return. Nor with the Houthis
in control of more territory today is it practical to predicate a ceasefire on
these anachronistic terms.
A rationale must be given
for entering negotiations. An end to the Saudi blockade of the country is a
start, but it is the prospect of a power sharing arrangement after these first
steps in the process that makes peace talks a possibility. In other words,
instead of squabbling with the Houthis over ceasefire conditions, the US should
spell out a vision of what a peace settlement could look like.
Some say any sign of
concession merely emboldens the Houthis to push further -- as demonstrated by
the recent escalating violence in the Marib province, where the group has been
attempting to take the last significant city under the official government’s
control.
It is important to
understand that with peace negotiations more likely under President Joe Biden
than his predecessor, the Houthis are trying to strengthen their position on
the ground. This is no fault of the new US administration, it is simply the
nature of war and leverage, by no means unique to Yemen or the Houthis.
Others believe the Houthis
should not be allowed to hold any power at all. But it must be remembered peace
is made with enemies, not friends. As in Afghanistan, where the US has been
negotiating with the Taliban, the harsh reality remains to work with an
unsavory group -- or continue the war.
If peace is to be made, the
US should not only address port blockades, but more importantly lay down a
framework for serious and credible negotiations. This would best be delivered
through a new US-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution to replace that of
2015. It would demonstrate that a failed international framework had been truly
jettisoned.
The Biden administration
could begin by dropping the impractical surrender demands of old and compel the
lifting of the Saudi blockade. It should also impose an arms embargo on all
warring parties in Yemen that includes a ban on weapons financing and drone and
missile technology. The UK and France have not followed the US in halting arms
sales to Saudi Arabia, but it seems unlikely they would oppose a new US-led UN
resolution, even less vote against it. While previous resolutions imposing
embargos on Somalia and Libya have hardly halted all sales or supply to those
countries, they have certainly stopped nations with a vested interest in
appearing lawful in equipping those on the ground.
Any new resolution should
also require foreign troops to leave Yemen. This means the Saudis should leave
the eastern province of Mahra, and the Emiratis the southern islands of Socotra
and Mayun,The Gulf states’ intervention has not returned the government, long
in exile in Saudi Arabia, back to power, nor brought peace: Rather, the Yemeni
government’s continued residence stokes new local conflicts and helps
legitimize a Houthi narrative of loss of sovereignty. Houthis, for their part,
should understand that they cannot continue to fight their way to power through
violence and, as a gesture of goodwill, they should immediately release
political prisoners.
The resolution should also
envisage a broader mediation framework that starts with the acknowledgment that
this has never been a war just between two sides. Houthis, the Islah-Muslim
Brotherhood, Southern separatists, traditional political parties, women and
civil society groups -- indeed, any domestic actor that has a stake in Yemen’s
future, or perversely the conflict’s continuation -- must participate one way
or another in peace talks. Without them, peace will never be stable.
Finally, and to build
confidence in a new political process, the resolution should call for all armed
activities by all sides to cease simultaneously -- with no pre-conditions. The
resolution must, therefore, create the conditions for Yemenis to negotiate
among themselves, free from outside interference.
Ultimately, it is for
Yemenis to decide what a viable power sharing deal would look like. The Yemeni
elites must cease their excessive reliance on outsiders to solve their problems
and stop blaming them for everything that has gone wrong in the country.
Will this work? There is no
guarantee a new UN Security Council resolution will pass regardless of its
contents. There is similarly no certainty it would be fully implemented on the
ground in Yemen if it were. But by promoting a new text -- with new practical
rather than old fantastical demands -- it would act as a signal of intent: That
America is deadly serious about finding new paths to bring peace to the people
of Yemen.
Jamal Benomar is Chair of
the International Center for Dialogue Initiatives. He was formerly United
Nations special envoy to Yemen and U.N. under-secretary general.
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